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FORWARD PROGRESS: A NEW PATTERN
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION FOR
IMPEACHMENT WITH PRIOR INCONSISTENT
STATEMENTS WILL EASE THE COURT’S
BURDEN BY EMPHASIZING THE PROSECUTOR’S
Hugh M. Mundy*
INTRODUCTION
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), a testifying witness’s
prior inconsistent statement is admissible as proof in a criminal or civil trial
only if it “was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding or in a deposition.”1 On the other hand, Federal Rule of
Evidence 613 provides that virtually any oral or written prior inconsistent
statement is admissible to attack a declarant-witness’s credibility.2 Though
the distinction is vital from an evidentiary perspective, it is often lost on
jurors.3 As a result, courts must give juries a limiting instruction to explain
the permissible use of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement.4 To say the
least, the value of such an instruction is dubious.5 Edmund Morgan, the
author of the Model Code of Evidence, famously derided judicial attempts
to differentiate a prior inconsistent statement to impeach from one
admissible as proof (or “for its truth”) as “a pious fraud.”6
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. The author expresses his
gratitude to Adam Bolotin, Jessica Brierly-Snowden, Olympia Duhart, Jillian Kassel, and
Christine Kraly for their research and editorial assistance and to Dean John Corkery and The
John Marshall Law School for support of the Symposium on Hearsay Reform.
1. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). Notably, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) requires only that the
declarant-witness is subject to cross-examination about the prior inconsistent statement at the
current proceeding. As a result, a declarant-witness’s grand jury testimony falls within the
scope of the rule. United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 958–59 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
2. FED. R. EVID. 613(b).
3. Steven V. DeBraccio, That’s (Not) What She Said: The Case for Expanding
Admission of Prior Inconsistent Statements in New York Criminal Trials, 78 ALB. L. REV.
269, 295 (2014) (“[T]here are times when lay jurors may not be able to take evidence merely
as impeachment, and not substantive evidence.”).
4. See, e.g., COMM. ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.16 (2015) [hereinafter THIRD CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS].
5. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 193–94 (1948).
6. Id. at 193.

1455

1456

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Due in part to the “difficult-to-follow” instruction, the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (“the Advisory Committee” or
“the Committee”) is now contemplating the expansion of Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
to allow for the substantive admissibility of all prior inconsistent
statements.7 While a revised rule would obviate the need for a limiting
instruction, the change would enable federal prosecutors to offer out-ofcourt statements of tenuous reliability as proof against criminal defendants.
A more just approach lies in a recrafted jury instruction—one which frames
the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements in terms of the
prosecutor’s burden of proof.
In this Article, I discuss the history of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), focusing on the
origins and importance of the Rule’s restrictive language. In addition, I
review the current federal landscape of pattern criminal jury instructions for
witness impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement.8 Finally, I
propose a revised jury instruction designed to clarify juror confusion while
maintaining the critical safeguards for substantive admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF RULE 801(D)(1)(A) SAFEGUARDS
The treatment of a declarant-witness’s prior inconsistent statements by
the inaugural Advisory Committee was a topic of “considerable
controversy.”9 At common law, prior inconsistent statements were hearsay
and admissible only to impeach a witness’s trial testimony.10 Ostensibly,
the basis for the common law prohibition was that “the conditions of oath,
cross-examination, and demeanor observation” did not accompany the prior
statement.11 The Advisory Committee found the common law rule
“troublesome” as it failed to “explain[] why cross-examination cannot be
The Committee likewise
conducted subsequently with success.”12
questioned concerns over “demeanor observation” as “[t]he trier of fact has
the declarant before it” to “see and hear” him or her.13 Finally, the “mere
presence” of an oath, the Committee noted, “receives much less emphasis
than cross-examination as a truth-compelling device.”14 Consequently, the
Committee took the opposite tack, declaring that all prior inconsistent
statements “are substantive evidence.”15

7. Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules,
to Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 120, 121 (Mar. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Capra Memo]
(on file with the Fordham Law Review).
8. For the sake of brevity, I refer to jury instructions concerning witness impeachment
by a prior inconsistent statement as Rule 613 instructions.
9. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note.
10. See id. (“Prior inconsistent statements traditionally have been admissible to impeach
but not as substantive evidence.”).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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The Advisory Committee’s pendulum swing did not survive
congressional review. Instead, the House Committee on the Judiciary
severely limited Rule 801(d)(1)(A) to admit as substantive evidence only
prior inconsistent statements “made while the declarant was subject to
cross-examination at a trail [sic] or hearing or in a deposition.”16 Unlike
the Advisory Committee, the House Committee viewed the oath and
“context of a formal proceeding” as “firm . . . assurances” of a prior
statement’s reliability.17 A subsequent joint House/Senate Committee
amendment eliminated the cross-examination prerequisite as “[Rule
801(d)(1)(A)] only comes into play when the witness testifies in the present
trial.”18 Thus, the rule’s current limitations—“given under penalty of
perjury at trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition”—reflect a
balance between the expansive Advisory Committee proposal and the
House’s more conservative approach.19
Viewed one way, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) has limited utility as only a small
fraction of prior inconsistent statements falls within its exacting ambit.20
Still, the rule plays an essential gatekeeping function in limiting the
substantive admissibility of unreliable out-of-court statements. First,
despite the Advisory Committee’s diminished view of oath taking, the
formalities concomitant with 801(d)(1)(A) statements provide assurances of
The oath and attendant procedural structure establish
reliability.21
bookends that buttress testimonial credibility. On one side, in taking the
oath, a witness “must commit himself to truth-telling in advance of his
testimony.”22 On the other, the oath ensures that a witness may be tried for
perjury if it is later “demonstrated that he failed to tell the truth after
promising to do so.”23
More important, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) prior inconsistent statements are
transcribed or otherwise recorded. As a result, when offered as evidence at
trial, the substance of the witness’s statement is unambiguous.24 To the
contrary, prior inconsistent statements offered to impeach often arise from

16. Id. 801(d)(1)(A); H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 13 (1973). The House Committee’s
position as to the cross-examination requirement tracks the logic of State v. Saporen, 285
N.W. 898, 901 (Minn. 1939) (“The chief merit of cross examination is not that at some
future time it gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony. Its principal
virtue is in its immediate application of the testing process.”).
17. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 13.
18. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note; S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7062
(1973).
19. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
20. See Capra Memo, supra note 7, at 121 (“It goes without saying that the vast majority
of prior inconsistent statements are not made under oath at a formal proceeding.”).
21. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 16.
22. Robert C. Sorensen, The Effectiveness of the Oath to Obtain a Witness’ True
Personal Opinion, 47 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 284, 286 (1956) (describing
the oath’s two-fold “deterrent to falsehood”).
23. Id.
24. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 13 (“[U]nlike in most other situations involving unsworn or
oral statements, there can be no dispute as to whether the prior statement was made.”).
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conversations, written notes, or other informal communications.25 These
sources leave the declarant-witness’s past words susceptible to the faulty
memory, misinterpretation, or manipulation of another. Indeed, a declarantwitness’s own lack of—or selective—memory at trial may be impeached
with evidence of a prior inconsistent statement if the trial court determines
that the memory lapse is disingenuous.26 In such cases, another witness
may testify about the declarant-witness’s alleged prior statements,
presenting a battle of dueling recollections. While cross-examination
ideally functions as a “truth-compelling device,” an adversarial back-andforth may just as easily obfuscate the facts.27 Ultimately, absent Rule
801(d)(1)(A)’s recording requirement, jurors would be instructed to treat as
“true” prior statements of uncertain veracity.
Further, law enforcement custodial interrogations and investigative
interviews present especially problematic sources of witness prior
inconsistent statements. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) wisely excludes interrogations
and interviews by police even if a declarant-witness’s statement is written
and sworn.28 Arrestees are usually unrepresented by counsel during
custodial interrogations and waive their Miranda rights,29 tilting the balance
of power heavily toward law enforcement.30 In the rare instance that an
arrestee invokes his or her Miranda rights, a prosecutor may still impeach
the arrestee-witness at a later trial with his or her pre-Miranda silence.31
Even custodial statements taken in violation of Miranda may be used to
impeach a witness’s later testimony.32 Not surprisingly, the inherently
coercive interrogation environment risks false confessions and

25. See, e.g., Jankins v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 21 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding
that Federal Rule of Evidence 613(a) “clearly contemplates that a witness’s prior oral
statement” may be used to impeach his trial testimony).
26. See United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 516 (6th Cir. 2008).
27. When extrinsic evidence is offered as evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, the
witness must be given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement. In reality, the
explanation or denial may have the opposite effect of highlighting the prior inconsistent
statement, especially if counsel is required to recall a declarant-witness to the stand to
challenge his or her alleged inconsistency. See FED. R. EVID. 613(b) advisory committee’s
note (stating that the opportunity to explain is subject to “no specification [to] any particular
time or sequence”).
28. See United States v. Day, 789 F.2d 1217, 1222–23 (6th Cir. 1986).
29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. See Bryan L. Sykes, Eliza Solowiej & Evelyn J. Patterson, The Fiscal Savings of
Accessing the Right to Legal Counsel Within Twenty-Four Hours of Arrest: Chicago and
Cook County, 2013, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 813, 816, 819 (2015) (documenting that only 0.2
percent of individuals arrested in Cook County, Illinois, had a defense lawyer at the police
station; about 80 percent of arrestees waived their Miranda rights).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Musquiz, 45 F.3d 927, 930–31 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that, after the defendant offered an innocent explanation for his alleged criminal conduct on
direct examination at trial, the prosecution was permitted to impeach him with his failure to
offer the same explanation between his arrest and Miranda warnings).
32. See, e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 312 (1990) (holding that “illegally
obtained” prior inconsistent statements may be offered to impeach a defendant’s trial
testimony). A defendant’s prior inconsistent statement may otherwise be admissible as proof
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A).
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accusations—especially as to arrestees who are threatened with more severe
treatment unless the “true culprit” is named.33
In fact, noncustodial investigative interviews may also produce false
accusations by suspects or witnesses. In a 2008 study of the influence of
police interviewing techniques on false witness statements, researchers
asked college students a series of questions about the instigator of a
computer crash.34 After a “relatively low-pressure” interview, 45 percent
of the participants falsely implicated a peer.35 Notwithstanding data
undercutting the reliability of statements made during interrogations and
interviews, such statements remain fair game for witness impeachment.36
Extending their availability as proof of the defendant’s guilt, however,
would increase the danger of wrongful convictions.37 Interestingly, as
protection against the admission of false confessions and accusations,
prosecutors and defense counsel alike recommend a basic assurance that
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) requires: recording of the prior statement.38

33. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions:
Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6 (2010) (noting that the “single-minded
purpose” of interrogation is “not to discern the truth” but “to elicit incriminating
statements . . . in an effort to secure the conviction of offenders”); see also Peter Whoriskey,
Execution of a Ga. Man Near Despite Recantations, WASH. POST (July 16, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/15/AR2007071501250.
html (reporting on recantations by key witnesses in the capital trial of Troy Davis who said
“they lied under pressure from police”) [perma.cc/XE5V-MUCK].
34. See Kirk A. B. Newring & William O’Donohue, False Confessions and Influenced
Witnesses, 4 APPLIED PSYCHOL. CRIM. JUST. 81, 87–90 (2008). The study employed the socalled “Reid technique,” a popular police method of questioning subjects.
35. Id. at 98.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 789 F.2d 1217, 1223 (6th Cir. 1986).
37. A typical scenario in which a prior inconsistent statement is offered to impeach
involves a police officer’s testimony about a recanting witness’s prior statement or the
production of the witness’s written statement as evidence. But studies have “consistently
shown” that only 54 percent of lay persons accurately discern an individual’s truthfulness
and that “training does not produce reliable improvement [so] police
investigators . . . perform only slightly better, if at all—albeit with high levels of
confidence.” Kassin, supra note 33, at 6. If offered as true through the testimony of an
officer, prior inconsistent statements stemming from police encounters would provide
powerful evidence of guilt despite a coin-flip chance of falsity.
38. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces
Significant Policy Shift Concerning Electronic Recording of Statements (May 22, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-announces-significant-policy-shiftconcerning-electronic-recording (outlining policy requiring electronic recording of custodial
interviews to ensure “an objective account” of “interactions with people who are held in
federal custody”) [perma.cc/332A-68A5]; News Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def.
Lawyers, Department of Justice Announces New Policy Concerning the Recording of
Custodial Interrogations (May 21, 2014), http://www.nacdl.org/NewsReleases.aspx?id
=33171 (“NACDL has long advocated the recording of interrogations as a practice that
ensures the transparency, integrity and propriety of the interrogation process.”)
[perma.cc/4WEC-B6G9].
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF RULE 613
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Pattern jury instructions across federal circuits reflect varied language as
to the use of prior inconsistent statements that lack Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
safeguards. The instructions range from general guidance to consider a
declarant-witness’s previous inconsistencies in an overall credibility
assessment to specific warnings that certain prior inconsistent statements
are inadmissible “for their truth.” On one end of the spectrum, the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits typify the use of broad directives regarding
impeachment evidence. The Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instructions lack an
express instruction covering a witness’s prior inconsistent statements.39
Instead, the model instruction covering witness credibility directs jurors to
consider “whether [the] witness said something different at an earlier time”
in “deciding what testimony to believe.”40 Commentary to the instruction
places the onus on the party seeking to restrict the use of a previous
statement to request a Rule 105 limiting instruction.41 In like fashion, the
commentary to the Ninth Circuit’s catch-all impeachment instruction notes
that Rule 105 permits a defendant to request an instruction limiting use of a
prior inconsistent statement “to determine the credibility of the witness.”42
On the opposite end, the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits establish
express parameters around the use of Rule 613 statements. The Third
Circuit instruction first cautions jurors that a witness’s prior inconsistent
statement may be used “only to help you decide whether you believe [his or
her] testimony here at trial.”43 The instruction then continues, “You cannot
use [the earlier statement] as proof of the truth of what the witness said.”44
Similarly, Fifth Circuit juries are instructed that Rule 613 statements “were
not admitted in evidence to prove that the contents of those statements are
true.”45 Rather, the instruction limits the jurors’ use of the earlier statement
to determine the “credibility of [the] witness.”46 The Seventh Circuit
follows suit, if somewhat more elliptically.47 Jurors are instructed to
consider prior inconsistent statements for the “truthfulness” of the witness’s
trial testimony but not for the “truth” of the statement itself.48
39. See JUDICIAL COMM. ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF
MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
(2014). The model instructions, however, include an instruction regarding impeachment of a
defendant’s testimony with an “otherwise inadmissible statement,” such as one obtained in
violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. Id. at 57.
40. Id. at 72.
41. See id. at 72 n.1.
42. NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 65 (2010).
43. THIRD CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 4, § 2.16.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES ASS’N FIFTH CIRCUIT,
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 22 (2015) (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. COMM. ON FED. JURY CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,
PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 24 (2014).
48. Id. at 29.
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Still other circuits strike a middle ground, providing a pattern instruction
that covers the appropriate use of a prior inconsistent statement without
express admonitions against the statement’s “truthfulness.”49 For example,
the First Circuit instructs jurors to “consider” a witness’s earlier statement
“to help you decide how much of [the witness’s] testimony to believe.”50
Any inconsistency, the instruction advises, may “affect[] the believability”
of the witness’s trial testimony.51 Likewise, the Sixth and Tenth Circuit
instructions on impeachment by prior inconsistencies provide that the
witness’s prior statement “was brought to your attention only to help you
decide how believable his testimony was.”52 Both instructions prohibit use
of the statement “as proof of anything else.”53 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
instructions on use of inconsistent statements for impeachment echo the
First and Tenth Circuits’ core concern about a declarant-witness’s
honesty.54
III. A NEW RULE 613 PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION
A recent study by the American Association of Trial Consultants
reaffirmed that jurors “are confused by jury instructions and often disregard
them.”55 The study attributed juror confusion to several factors, including
“low average” literacy levels combined with the “linguistic complexity” of
various jury instructions.56 The resulting comprehension gap leads many
jurors to replace legal concepts with “easier questions, stereotypes and
cognitive shortcuts.”57 To discourage juror reliance on these “shortcuts,”
the study recommended the use of instructions with “understandable”

49. The Federal Judicial Center’s Pattern Jury Instructions provide the template for these
“middle ground” instructions. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PATTERN CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 32 (1987), http://federalevidence.com/pdf/JuryInst/FJC_Crim_1987.pdf
(“These earlier statements were brought to your attention to help you decide if you believe
___’s testimony. You cannot use these earlier statements as evidence in this case.”)
[perma.cc/JVP8-5LMS].
50. U.S. DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF ME., 2015 REVISIONS TO PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT 26 (2015).
51. Id.
52. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMM. ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, SIXTH CIRCUIT
PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.04 (2015) [hereinafter SIXTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; see also TENTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 21
(2011) [hereinafter TENTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
53. SIXTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 52, § 7.04; see also TENTH
CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 52, at 21. The commentary to the Tenth
Circuit instructions advises that a limiting instruction should also be given upon request.
54. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 24–28 (2010) (“[A]sk whether there was evidence that at
some other time a witness said or did something, or didn’t say or do something, that was
different from the testimony the witness gave during this trial. [If so], you must decide
whether it was because of an innocent lapse in memory or an intentional deception.”).
55. Steven E. Perkel & Benjamin Perkel, Jury Instructions: Work in Progress, JURY
EXPERT, May 2015, at 1, http://www.thejuryexpert.com/wp-content/uploads/TJEMay2015_
workinprogress.pdf [perma.cc/P8ZX-V3ND].
56. Id. at 1–3.
57. Id. at 3.
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vocabulary (or “non-legalese”), active voice, concrete phrasing, and
“examples relevant to everyday life.”58
To further improve the understanding and retention of difficult legal
concepts, “countless studies” support the value of visual aids and cues.59
To this end, the incorporation of visuals may assist jurors not only when an
instruction is initially given but also throughout deliberations. Visuals are
presently utilized in select pattern jury instructions, particularly those
involving burden of proof.60 For instance, to describe preponderance of the
evidence, the Third Circuit pattern civil jury instructions ask jurors to
imagine the parties’ evidence on “opposite sides” of a scale.61 To prevail,
the plaintiff must “make the scales tip somewhat on [his or her] side.”62 In
criminal cases, a typical—if less concrete—visual aid casts “proof beyond a
reasonable doubt” as “proof which is so convincing that you would not
hesitate to rely and act on it in making the most important decisions in your
own lives.”63
Juror confusion may be uniquely acute over matters of hearsay and “truth
of the matter asserted,” an area that frequently confounds lawyers and
judges.64 As a consequence, Rule 613 pattern jury instructions which focus
on the “truth” as a legal abstraction are prone to juror misinterpretation.65
Alternatively, the notion of substantive admissibility may be more
effectively defined as “evidence that advances the prosecutor’s burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” First, the prosecutor’s burden of proof
in criminal cases is well-known to almost every juror—and is the subject of
a separate jury instruction. Thus, the use of the familiar burden to
contextualize the evidentiary value of prior inconsistent statements for
witness impeachment will facilitate juror comprehension. Additionally,
describing the distinction in the language of burden “advancement” reflects
best practices for jury instructions, including incorporation of active voice,
concrete phrasing, and colloquial language. To better elucidate the
relationship between prior inconsistent statements admitted to impeach and
the prosecutor’s burden, an improved instruction should also include an
easily understood visual aid. For instance, the instruction might evoke

58. Id. at 3–4.
59. See Haig Kouyoumdjian, Learning Through Visuals: Visual Imagery in the
Classroom, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 20, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/getpsyched/201207/learning-through-visuals (“[T]he effective use of visuals can decrease
learning time, improve comprehension, enhance retrieval, and increase retention.”)
[perma.cc/YEU7-2VER].
60. See, e.g., THIRD CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 4, § 1.10.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. SIXTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 52, § 1.03.
64. Paul S. Milich, Re-Examining Hearsay Under the Federal Rules: Some Method for
the Madness, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 893, 893–95 (1991) (citing sources characterizing the
hearsay rule as “bizarre,” “a crazy quilt,” and “an unintelligible thicket”); see also JAMES W.
MCELHANEY, MCELHANEY’S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 265 (4th ed. 2005) (describing lawyers’
impression of the hearsay rule as “baffling,” “amazingly complex,” and “impossible to
apply”).
65. See, e.g., supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
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“forward progress,” a common term in football describing “the progress of
the ballcarrier towards the opposition’s goalline.”66 Integrating these
concepts, a revised pattern jury instruction for witness impeachment with a
prior inconsistent statement might read as follows:
The witness’s earlier statements were brought to your attention only to
help you decide if you believe [his or her] trial testimony. The
government cannot use the statements to advance its burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. To put it differently, imagine a football team
attempting to move the ball towards its opponent’s goal line. The
witness’s prior statements would not advance the team’s forward
progress. Instead, the ball would remain in the same position on the
field.67

CONCLUSION
As the Advisory Committee Notes reflect, the restrictions to the
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements in Rule
801(d)(1)(A) evolved through thoughtful deliberation and compromise.
Then as now, the limitations provide essential assurances of a prior
statement’s truth. Consequently, their wholesale eradication would invite
the admission of unreliable evidence in criminal cases. Instead, a more
prudent and pragmatic approach includes the adoption of a plain-language
pattern jury instruction highlighting the difference between prior
inconsistent statements admissible to impeach and those offered for their
truth. The revised instruction will enable courts to more cogently explain
the important distinction to juries while emphasizing the prosecutor’s
burden of proof. Moreover, rather than a tectonic shift away from the
safeguards embodied in Rule 801(d)(1)(A), the proposed revisions represent
an incremental step toward more effective application of the Rule’s
longstanding and meaningful restrictions.

66. Forward Progress, SPORTSDEFINITIONS.COM, http://www.sportsdefinitions.com/
american-football/Forward-progress.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/PQ6S8RZ2]. While sports analogies may fail to land with some jurors, professional football has
remained the most popular sport among U.S. adults for more than three decades and
continues to gain viewership. See Darren Rovell, NFL Most Popular for 30th Year in a Row,
ESPN (Jan. 26, 2014), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/10354114/harris-poll-nfl-mostpopular-mlb-2nd (citing a Harris Poll that “35 percent of fans call the NFL their favorite
sport, followed by Major League Baseball” at 14 percent) [perma.cc/6KW7-N9UG]; John
Breech, Super Bowl 49 Watched by 114.4M, Sets U.S. TV Viewership Record, CBSSPORTS
(Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/25019076/super-bowl-49watched-by-1144m-sets-us-tv-viewership-record (reporting that the 2015 Super Bowl was
the “most watched television show in U.S. history”) [perma.cc/ND65-FWQW].
67. It should be noted that sports metaphors, especially those based upon the
traditionally male-dominated sport of football, may promote or reinforce gender bias. See
LIA LITOSSELITI, GENDER AND LANGUAGE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 145 (2014) (“[T]he effects
[of sports metaphors] are complex and the viability of gender-neutral metaphors is
debatable.”). To address those concerns, an alternative visual aid might liken the
government’s case to “rungs on a ladder” or “steps on a staircase.”

